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Susanne Baier-Allen 
Europe and America 
For over 70 years since the end of World War II, the US and Europe have 
been bound together in a unique and unprecedented relationship. While there 
have been many times of friction, there were never doubts regarding the core 
foundation of this relationship. It was common practice for all US presidents 
to emphasize the importance of European security and prosperity to America 
and affirm the common values between the two. Also, the US has shown its 
support at every step of European integration, viewing a united Europe as 
good for America. Two years into the Trump presidency, relations between 
the US and Europe are in disarray. Like no other American president before 
him, Donald Trump has undermined the credibility of the US in Europe and 
cast severe doubts on the reliability of America as an ally. He not only 
lumped the EU together with Russia and China and called it a “foe”.1 He also 
repeatedly questioned US membership of NATO, if not the value of the 
organization as a whole.2 But not only that: Rhetoric has also led to policy 
shifts in a number of areas, which have alienated the transatlantic partners, 
if not brought them head-to-head. 
Government officials, representatives of international organizations, foreign 
policy pundits, and news commentators have tried to read beyond Trump’s 
 
1  Interview by Jeff Glor with Donald Trump on CBS News, 15 July 2018, “I think the 
European Union is a ‘foe’ Trump says ahead of Putin meeting in Helsinki”, CBS 
News, 15 July 2018. Online at: https://www.cbsnews.com/news/donald-trump-
interview-cbs-news-european-union-is-a-foe-ahead-of-putin-meeting-in-helsinki-
jeff-glor/. 
2  Christopher S. Chivvis and Jana Puglierin, “Transatlantic Relations after Obama”, 
The RAND Blog, 14 October 2016. Online at: https://www.rand.org/blog/2016/10/ 
transatlantic-relations-after-Obama.html. 
 
Internet resources, last date of access: April 30, 2019. 
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outbursts against America’s European allies: Are all these signs that the US 
is turning its back on Europe? And, will this be the “new American normal”3, 
where the US is no longer willing to lead the Western world? Or is this just 
an aberration in transatlantic relations under Trump and his administration? 
To assess the state of the relationship between the US and Europe it is 
important to cut through the noise of Trump’s Twitter feeds and take a closer 
look at some of the policies of his administration, the issues he has raised 
vis-à-vis Europe, and the impact this has had on the relationship. 
1. On 1 June 2017, Trump followed through on his campaign promise to 
withdraw from the Paris Climate Accord, calling it a “bad deal”4 which cost 
the US billions. The Accord had been won after a decade of negotiations 
where both the EU and the US under Obama played a strong role. While the 
US departure will not become formally effective until the end of 2020, the 
decision’s immediate effect was that the EU stepped up its efforts to keep 
the deal alive by signing a climate vision with China and Canada. It also 
lobbied the BRICS countries to stay committed to the Accord. Furthermore, 
it made clear to countries considering a withdrawal that it will not sign trade 
agreements with them unless they are part of the Accord.5  
Within the US, Trump’s decision was backed by his party, but has rallied 
state governors, mayors and business leaders in support of the Accord. So 
far, over 2,700 states, cities and businesses, equivalent to the size of the third 
largest economy in the world, have committed to the emissions goals and 
 
3  Griff Witte and Michael Birnbaum, “As tensions with Trump deepen, Europe 
wonders if America is lost for good”, The Washington Post, 19 May 2018. Online at: 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/as-tensions-with-trump-deepen-
europe-wonders-if-america-is-lost-for-good/2018/05/18/6f90c56e-587f-11e8-9889-
07bcc1327f4b_story.html?utm_term=.50c3ed110635. 
4  Michael D. Shear, “Trump Will Withdraw U.S. From Paris Climate Agreement”, 
New York Times, 1 June 2017. Online at: https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/01/ 
climate/trump-paris-climate-agreement.html. 
5  Dave Keating, “The Paris Climate Agreement Survived Trump. Can It Survive 
Brazil’s Bolsonaro?”, Forbes, 24 October 2018. Online at: https://www.forbes.com 
/sites/davekeating/2018/10/24/the-paris-climate-agreement-survived-trump-can-it-
survive-brazils-bolsonaro/#6d560c556435. 
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targets.6 Thus, while the US on a national level has isolated itself and lost its 
influence on the negotiating table over a major agreement impacting its 
future, commitment to the deal has at least stayed alive on the state and local 
level. The date the US is set to formally leave the Accord coincides with the 
next US presidential elections. While a different US president (especially 
from the Democrats) may renew the commitment, there have already been 
three damaging effects attributed to Trump’s withdrawal: a) US federal 
rollbacks have made fossil fuel investments globally more attractive again, 
b) the US has set a precedent for others to follow suit (Russia and Turkey 
have yet to ratify) or abandon measures to comply (Australia), and c) by not 
paying the $ 2 billion the US had pledged for the Green Climate Fund and 
developed countries’ opposition to reporting how they will scale up their 
financial commitments, climate finance is in the balance while distrust 
between developing and developed countries has grown.7 These effects are 
showing that the US plays a vital role in shaping global policies to climate 
change. It remains to be seen to what extent the EU and its members, in 
concert with other countries, can fill the void the US has left. 
2.  In October 2017, Trump decided to stop certifying that Iran was 
compliant with the 2015 nuclear deal (formally known as the Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action or JCPOA), requesting a renegotiation of its 
terms or termination. After eight months of limbo, and in spite of intense EU 
lobbying, he announced the withdrawal of the US from the agreement 
altogether. It was not that the US had found Iran in breach of the deal. On 
the contrary, even Trump administration officials confirmed that Iran was 
abiding by it. Instead, Trump cited reasons outside the scope of the JCPOA, 
such as Iran’s anti-ballistic missiles program, state-sponsored terrorism, and 
the country’s involvement in regional conflicts including Syria, Yemen, and 
 
6  Nathan Hultman and Paul Bodnar, “Trump tried to kill the Paris agreement, but the 
effect has been the opposite”, Brookings PlanetPolicy, 1 June 2018. Online at: 
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/planetpolicy/2018/06/01/trump-tried-to-kill-the-
paris-agreement-but-the-effect-has-been-the-opposite/. 
7  For details, see Joseph Curtin, The Paris Climate Agreement versus the Trump 
Effect: Countervailing Forces for Decarbonisation, IIEA, 3 December 2018.  
Online at: https://www.iiea.com/publication/the-paris-climate-agreement-versus-
the-trump -effect-countervailing-forces-for-decarbonisation/. 
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Iraq.8 Washington’s unilateral withdrawal and imposition of sanctions put an 
end to a deal that marked “perhaps the most significant success of 
transatlantic cooperation in the 21st century.”9The European signatories of 
the deal, Germany, France, and the UK (also known as the E3) have since 
been torn between going their own way and falling in line with the US. First, 
while they have vowed to stay committed to the deal, and even gone head-
to-head with the US by creating INSTEX – a special financial vehicle 
designed to continue trading with Iran outside the dollar –, they have limited 
its focus to humanitarian trade only, as this is not sanctioned by the US.10 
Given that the US has threatened the exclusion of any companies continuing 
to do business with Iran from the US market, it is doubtful that the special 
purpose vehicle will get used more widely and other than by small businesses 
with little to no US exposure.11 The many major European companies that 
have left Iran since last May for fear of being locked out of the US market 
so far attests to that.12  
Second, while the E3 cold-shouldered the US in either only sending low-
level diplomats to its Middle East conference in Warsaw or leaving early,13 
they did follow the US in demanding that Iran curb its missile program.14  
 
8  Remarks by President Trump on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, The White 
House, 8 May 2018. Online at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/ 
remarks-president-trump-joint-comprehensive-plan-action/. 
9  Riccardo Alcaro, “All is Not Quiet on the Western Front. Trump’s Iran Policy and 
Europe’s Choice on the Nuclear Deal”, IAI Papers 18, 7 April 2018, p. 2. Online at: 
https://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/iaip1807.pdf. 
10  Leila Gharagozlou, “EU implements new Iran trade mechanism”, NBC, 31 January 
2019. Online at: https://www.cnbc.com/2019/01/31/eu-implements-new-iran-trade-
mechanism.html. 
11  Steven Erlanger, “3 European Nations Create Firm To Trade with Iran, but Will 
Anyone Use it?”, New York Times, 31 January 2019. Online at: https://www.nytimes 
.com/2019/01/31/world/europe/europe-trade-iran-nuclear-deal.html. 
12  Jo Harper, “German firms lead exodus out of Iran”, DW, 21 September 2018. Online 
at: https://www.dw.com/en/german-firms-lead-exodus-out-of-iran/a-4557 7191. 
13  Patrick Wintour, “European powers to present cool front at Warsaw summit”, The 
Guardian, 14 February 2019. Online at: https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/ 
2019/feb/12/european-powers-take-backseat-in-us-polish-summit-on-middle-east. 
14  Ricardo Alcaro, “Crunch Time for Europe to Save the Iran Nuclear Deal”, IAI 
Commentaries 19, 7 January 2019, p. 4. Online at: https://www.iai.it/en/ 
pubblicazioni /crunch-time-europe-save-iran-nuclear-deal. 
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Finally, the EU imposed its own new sanctions on Iranian individuals tied to 
assassination plots15 and Germany banned Mahan Air, an Iranian airline 
connected by the US Treasury Department with supporting international 
terrorism. 16  Interestingly, at the end of February 2019, as the Trump 
administration prepared new sanctions against Hezbollah, the UK decided to 
ban the Iranian-backed group in its entirety, not just its military wing. In 
doing so, the UK has deviated from the stance of its French and German E3 
partners allowing it to target Iran indirectly. By coming around to the US’ 
view of Hezbollah as a terrorist organization, the UK can thus “satisfy the 
United States’ desire to counter Tehran’s destabilization of the Middle East 
… without undermining the EU’s goal of preventing the Islamic Republic 
from abandoning the deal.”17 
Through 2019, the US is likely to increase the pressure on Iran to re-negotiate 
and on the E3/EU to fall in line with its approach. Although the Europeans 
are also not entirely satisfied with the deal, they appear to play for time, 
trying to balance continuing to engage with, and incentivize, Iran without 
deepening the rift with the US.18 Iran appears to stay committed for now, but 
it is losing confidence in the Europeans to stand up to Trump and rescue the 
deal.19 
 
15  Michael Schwirtz and Ronen Bergman, “E.U. Imposes Sanctions on Iran Over 
Assassination Plots”, New York Times, 8 January 2019. Online at: https://www. 
nytimes.com/2019/01/08/world/europe/iran-eu-sanctions.html. 
16  Lewis Sanders, “Germany sanctions Iranian airline over spying claims”, DW, 21 
January 2019. Online at: https://www.dw.com/en/germany-sanctions-iranian-airline-
over-spying-claims/a-47161357. U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury 
Designates Mahan Air Service Provider”, Press Release, 8 July 2018. Online at: 
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm423. 
17  David Daquid, “UK’s Hezbollah Ban May Signal Tougher Stance on Iran”, Atlantic 
Council, 7 March 2019. Online at: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransource 
/uk-s-hezbollah-ban-may-signal-tougher-stance-on-iran. 
18  On Thin Ice: The Iran Nuclear Deal at Three, International Crisis Group, Report No. 
195, 16 January 2019, p. i and p. 22. Online at: https://www.crisisgroup.org/ middle-
east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/iran/195-thin-ice-iran-nuclear-deal-
three. 
19  Political science Professor Foad Izadi in an interview with Susanne Koelbl, “Wir 
können den Europäern nicht mehr trauen”, Der Spiegel, 6 March 2019. Online at: 
http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/iraner-foad-izadi-ueber-das-misstrauen-
gegenueber-europa-a-1256121.html. 
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3.  Unlike any of his predecessors, Trump has not shied away from using 
hostile language regarding the EU. In his view, shaped by his businessman 
perspective, the EU “was formed to take advantage of us on trade”20 and is 
therefore nothing but a competitor, if not a “foe” – just like Russia and China. 
Fact is that with over US $ 1.1 trillion the US and the EU have the largest 
trade relationship worldwide.21 When looking at the import and export flows 
between the two, the US has a trade deficit of between US $ 101 billion and 
US $ 153 billion.22 This trade imbalance is why Trump believes that the US 
“loses” and it has therefore been his frequent target. In attacking trade with 
the EU, he has especially singled out Germany as the EU country with by far 
the largest US exports 23  and the biggest beneficiary in this trade 
relationship.24 
Having suspended talks on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP) in 2017, Trump started taking measures regarding trade 
in early 2018, risking a trade war. In his view, “trade wars are good and easy 
to win”.25 Without involving Congress and violating WTO rules, Trump 
imposed a 25 % tariff on steel and 10 % tariff on aluminum imports on 23 
March 2018 citing “national security”. While the EU was originally 
exempted, the tariffs also became effective in Europe on 1 June 2018.  
 
20  Trump in an interview with Lesley Stahl on 60 Minutes, CBS, 15 October 2018. 
Online at: https://www.cbsnews.com/news/donald-trump-full-interview-60-minutes 
-transcript-lesley-stahl-2018-10-14/. 
21  Alanna Petroff, “Europe and the US have the world’s most important business ties”, 
CNN Money, 11 July 2018. Online at: https://money.cnn.com/ 2018/07/11/news 
/economy/us-eu-tariffs-trade/. 
22  Petroff, 2018. ifo Standpunkt Nr. 197: Warum Trump im Handelskonflikt mit der EU 
schlechtere Karten hat als gegenüber China, 31 May 2018. Online at: 
https://www.cesifo-group.de/de/ifoHome/policy/Viewpoints/Standpunkte-Archiv/ 
stp-2018/Ifo-Viewpoint-No-197.html. 
23  Office of the United States Trade Representative, European Union. Online at: 
https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/europe-middle-east/europe/european-union. 
24  Susan B. Glasser, “How Trump made war on Angela Merkel and Europe”, The New 
Yorker, 24 & 31 December 2018. Online at: https://www.newyorker.com/ 
magazine/2018/12/24/how-trump-made-war-on-angela-merkel-and-europe.  
25  @realDonaldTrump, 2 March 2018 2:50 AM. Online at: https://twitter.com/ 
realdonaldtrump/status/969525362580484098?lang=en. 
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Although economists urged restraint,26 the EU reacted in line with the WTO 
Agreement on Safeguards by suspending trade concessions on certain steel 
imports as well as select goods roughly equal to the amount that the US 
tariffs on steel and aluminum incur on EU countries.27 Duties were especially 
raised on products manufactured in Republican-run or critical swing states, 
such as bourbon whiskey, orange juice, tobacco, peanut butter, motorbikes, 
and jeans. 28  Meanwhile, Trump also threatened to raise the tariff on 
European cars from currently 2.5 % to 20 %, eying Germany in particular, 
whose automobile industry would be hit hardest.29 In a meeting between 
Trump and EU Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker at the end of July 
2018, the two sides reached a “semi-truce”.30 Neither backed down from the 
existing tariffs, but Trump backed off from introducing car tariffs while the 
EU conceded to buy more soybeans and liquefied natural gas. The two also 
vowed to work toward an agreement on “zero tariffs, zero non-tariff barriers, 
and zero subsidies on non-auto industrial goods”, drawing criticism that the 
EU reneged on the pledge that it would only discuss trade agreements with 
countries that are signatories of the Paris Climate Accord 31  while also 
 
26  Sebastian Dullien, “Economists’ tunnel vision in the current trade conflict: What 
does Trump really want?”, ECFR Commentary, 26 April 2018. Online at: 
https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_economists_tunnel_vision_in_the_current
_trade_conflict_what_does. 
27  WTO Council for Trade in Goods and Committee on Safeguards, Immediate 
Notification under Article 12.5 of the Agreement on Safeguards to the Council for 
Trade in Goods of proposed suspension of concessions and other obligations referred 
to in Paragraph 2 of Article 8 of the Agreement on Safeguards, G/L/1237, 
G/SG/N/12/EU/1, 18 May 2018. Online at: http://docs.dpaq.de/13629-eu-anmeldung 
_der_m_glichen_veregeltungsz_lle_bei_der_wto.pdf. 
28  Jack Ewing, “Europe Retaliates Against Trump Tariffs”, The New York Times, 21 
June 2018. Online at: https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/21/business/economy/ 
europe-tariffs-trump-trade.html. 
29  Europe currently imposes a tariff of 10 % on cars imported from the US. Ewing, 21 
June 2018.  
30  Marie Kasperek quoted by David Wemer, “Was the Trump-Juncker Meeting Really 
a Success?”, Atlantic Council, New Atlanticist, 26 July 2018.  
Online at: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/was-the-trump-
juncker-meeting-really-a-success. 
31  Natalie Sauer, “EU committee shelves climate concerns to open US trade talks”, 
Climate Home News, 20 February 2019. Online at: https://www.climatechange 
news.com/2019/02/20/eu-committee-shelves-climate-concerns-open-us-trade-talks/. 
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igniting hope that TTIP could be revived.32 Both sides also agreed to pursue 
reform of the WTO, address unfair trading practices, forced technology 
transfer and industrial subsidies.33 
While the trade conflict continued into 2019, Trump’s goal of reducing the 
US trade deficit with the EU has so far backfired.34 Also, as companies such 
as Harley-Davidson started to consider transferring some of their production 
abroad, his “America First” agenda has come under threat.35 US soybean 
producers, on the other hand, have had reason to cheer. Their imports to the 
EU have increased 112 % in the second half of 2018 and are likely to increase 
further if the EU authorizes soybean use for biofuel.36 The increased soybean 
trade is important as the EU has effectively stepped in to replace China, 
which cut its US soybean imports as a result of its trade war with the US. 
Furthermore, with its WTO filing on 2 January 2019 for the extension of its 
provisional safeguard measures on steel imports from all trading partners, 
the EU appears to have signaled that it supports “a broader US policy agenda 
to bargain hard vis-à-vis China within the multilateral system”.37  
As of March 2019, talks between the US Trade Representative and EU Trade 
Commissioner have remained stuck in disagreement about the issues to 
negotiate. While the EU only wants to discuss tariffs on industrial goods and 
 
32  Gina Chon, “Trump and Juncker revive Obama-era trade goals”, Reuters, 25 July 
2018. Online at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-breakingviews/ 
breakingviews-trump-and-juncker-revive-obama-era-trade-goals-idUSKBN1KF 
31S. 
33  Wemer, 26 July 2018. 
34  According to recent numbers, the deficit grew in 2018 by US $17.9 bn. “Trump dealt 
blow as US deficit jumps”, BBC News, 6 March 2019. Online at: https://www.bbc 
.com/news/business-47472282. 
35  Jack Ewing, “Europe Feels the Squeeze of the Trump Trade Tariffs”, The New York 
Times, 2 August 2018. Online at: https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/02/business 
/economy/europe-trade-trump-tariffs.html. Philipp Inman, Graeme Wearden and 
Dominic Rushe, “Trump criticizes Harley-Davidson for ‘waving white flag’ by 
making bikes overseas, The Guardian, 25 June 2018. Online at: https://www. 
theguardian.com/business/2018/jun/25/harley-davidson-production-us-eu-tariffs-
motorcycles. 
36  Barbara C. Matthews, “Europe Signals Intent to Avoid Trade War With the US”, 
Atlantic Council, 9 January 2019. Online at: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs 
/new-atlanticist/europe-signals-intent-to-avoid-trade-war-with-the-united-states. 
37  Matthews, 9 January 2019. 
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easing the conformity assessment of technical standards, the US insists on 
including agriculture as well. It is unclear when talks will resume given that 
the European Parliament has rejected opening trade talks on March 14th, and 
some EU member countries prefer to wait until the end of May, when 
elections to the European Parliament are over. 38 Meanwhile, time is running 
out before Trump has to decide on the imposition of car tariffs on May 18th 
which, in spite of intense warnings from the US automotive industry, have 
become a real possibility.39 
Aside from starting a trade conflict, Trump has also sought to sow division 
within the EU and stoke anti-EU sentiments within its member states. 
Whereas previous presidents wanted the UK in Europe to expedite trade into 
continental Europe and counter any actions by EU members that were 
against US interests, Trump repeatedly said he favored Brexit.40 His reasons 
appear threefold: First, Brexiteers – like his supporters – have voted to take 
back sovereignty over their country and its borders. Second, Brexit may 
boost US leverage to claim economic concessions from a weakened EU. 
Third, it opens the potential for a bilateral trade agreement with the UK.41 In 
addition to getting involved in the Brexit debate, Trump also sympathized 
with far-right parties during national election campaigns in France and 
Germany as he saw an overlap of their goals and his anti-immigrant views. 
For the same reason, he has been praising Eastern European autocrats in 
Hungary and Poland as well as the populist government in Italy for their 
tough migration and refugee policies. The leaders of Hungary and Italy also 
 
38  Hung Tran, “US-EU Trade Negotiations: Talking Past Each Other”, Atlantic 
Council, 14 March 2019. Online at: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-
atlanticist/us-eu-trade-negotiations-talking-past-each-other.  
39  David Lawder, “U.S. agency submits auto tariff probe report to White House”, 
Reuters, 17 February 2019. Online at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-
autos/us-agency-submits-auto-tariff-probe-report-to-white-house-
idUSKCN1Q706C. 
40  David Frum, “Mr. Brexit”, The Atlantic, 15 November 2018. Online at: 
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/11/brexit-crisis-trump-abandoning-
uk-and-eu/575977/. 
41  Erik Brattberg and Nathaniel Rome, “The Limitations of the U.S. Approach to 
Brexit”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 28 November 2018. Online 
at: https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/11/28/limitations-of-u.s.-approach-to-brexit 
-pub-77820. 
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share Trump’s disdain for the EU and admiration for Vladimir Putin, and 
agree with him that sanctions against Russia should be lifted. In this climate, 
Europeans have become “unsure of whom to talk to in Washington”42 and 
none of the leaders of America’s key European allies has struck up a 
meaningful relationship with Trump. 
The election of Trump caused a significant increase in the EU’s popularity 
in Europe immediately after November 2016.43  However, the arduous Brexit 
negotiations, and disputes among EU members over sovereignty and 
migration (all issues that Trump has added his voice to), have weakened the 
EU and its cohesiveness.44 While initiatives for a new “European renewal”45 
are very laudable, the reality is that EU members have also turned more 
inward and become more parochial. The outcome of the upcoming elections 
to the European Parliament will provide a good indication of where Europe 
is headed. That said, the current US administration is likely to maintain its 
narrow and protectionist economic focus vis-à-vis the EU and try to use any 
cracks among its members to its advantage. 
4.  By repeatedly calling NATO obsolete and even threatening to leave the 
organization, Trump has raised doubts over the last two years whether the 
US would honor Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and come to the defense 
of an ally under attack.46 His rhetoric always came with a scolding that the 
European allies, and particularly Germany, were not spending enough for 
 
42  Dan Balz and Griff Witte, “Europeans fear Trump may threaten not just the 
transatlantic bond, but the state of their union”, The Washington Post, 4 February 
2019. Online at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/europeans-fear-trump-
may-threaten-not-just-the-transatlantic-bond-but-the-state-of-their-union/2019/02/ 
04/a874e9f4-25ad-11e9-81fd-b7b05d5bed90_story.html?utm_term=.538008b4effd. 
43  “How Trump and Brexit united Europe”, The Conversation, 20 December 2018. 
Online at: https://theconversation.com/how-trump-and-brexit-united-europe-
107945. 
44  Theo Sommer, “A new global order is in the offing”, German Times, March 2019. 
Online at: http://www.german-times.com/a-new-global-order-is-in-the-offing/. 
45  Elysée, For European renewal, 4 March 2019. Online at: https://www.elysee.fr/ 
emmanuel-macron/2019/03/04/for-european-renewal.en. 
46  Veronica Stracqualursi and Jima Acosta, “New York Times: Trump raised 
withdrawing the US from NATO several times in 2018”, CNN politics, 16 January 
2019. Online at: https://www.cnn.com/2019/01/15/politics/trump-nato-us-with 
draw/. 
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their defense as well as the insistence that they meet NATO’s target of 
spending 2 % of GDP (without saying that the goal is set for 2024). While 
Defense Secretary Mattis also repeatedly urged European allies to increase 
their defense spending, he was always clear in affirming the US 
administration’s commitment to the Alliance. In Congress, Trump’s 
disregard for NATO caused senators from both parties to twice sponsor a bill 
seeking to prevent any US president from withdrawing from the alliance 
without two-thirds approval in the Senate.47  
And in spite of his more recent reassurance that the US “will be with NATO 
100 %”,48 the House of Representatives also passed a bill with overwhelming 
bipartisan support prohibiting the use of federal funds to leave the 
organization.49 
Trump has not followed up his rhetoric with a reduced US engagement in 
Europe. He affirmed the commitment of the US to the defense efforts of the 
Baltic states and Poland, where the US leads NATO’s multinational 
battalion.50  
  
 
47  Rebecca Kheel, “Bipartisan senators reintroduce bill to prevent Trump from 
withdrawing from NATO”, The Hill, 17 January 2019. Online at: https://thehill. com/ 
policy/defense/425938-bipartisan-senators-reintroduce-bill-to-prevent-trump-from-
withdrawing-from. 
48  Joe Gould, “Trump says US backs NATO ‘100%,’ after threats he discussed 
withdrawal”, DefenseNews, 17 January 2019. Online at: https://www.defensenews. 
com/congress/2019/01/17/trump-says-us-backs-nato-100-after-report-he-discussed-
withdrawal/. 
49  Joe Gould, “US House votes overwhelmingly to bar US exit from NATO”, 
DefenseNews, 22 January 2019. Online at: https://www.defensenews.com/congress 
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During his presidency, funding for the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) 
has gone from US $ 3.4 billion in 2017 to US $ 4.8 billion in 2018 and US $ 
6.5 billion in 2019.51 As part of the EDI, Operation Atlantic Resolve was 
significantly strengthened in early 2017 when the first rotational brigade 
transferred to Europe with tanks and armored vehicles.52 The US has now 
the biggest contingent of tanks and fighting equipment in Europe since the 
end of the Cold War53 and NATO appears “stronger, more agile, and more 
engaged”. 54  US criticisms over their military expenditure have led to 
increases in European allies’ defense budgets and six are spending 2 percent 
or more of GDP in 2019 (compared to three in 2017). The spending increases 
in the Baltic states and Poland may however primarily be attributable to their 
concerns over Russian military aggression.55 While about half of NATO 
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members appear on track to meet the goal by 2024, the latest German 
financial plans mean that Germany will remain far below it.56 
Trump’s wavering commitment to NATO’s Article 5, has also sparked 
debates on the EU’s own defense. Following the NATO and G7 summits in 
2017, German Chancellor Angela Merkel famously called on the Europeans 
to take their fate into their own hands57 while her Foreign Minister Heiko 
Maas said that “our common response to ‘America First’ today must be 
‘Europe United’!”58 Merkel has so far failed to spell out what her words 
actually mean.59  Maas on the other hand has added at least some substance 
to his “Europe United” calling for “a balanced partnership” and the creation 
of “a new alliance of multilateralists” to “form a counterweight when the US 
crosses red lines”.60 More boldly, the French president Emmanuel Macron 
has proposed a “European Intervention Initiative” that envisages the 
assembly of troops from willing partners that can be deployed pragmatically, 
depending on demand and outside of the decision-making processes of the 
EU and NATO.61 In November 2018, he went as far as calling for a “true 
European army” to make Europe autonomous from the US and allow 
Europeans to protect themselves “with respect to China, Russia and even the 
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United States”. 62  In contrast to these multilateral approaches Poland, 
reassured by the continuing engagement of the US in Eastern Europe, has 
accepted that “Trump has fundamentally changed the way that international 
politics works” and concluded that it “needs to adapt to this new reality”. As 
a result, it has sought to strengthen its bilateral bonds with the US and signed 
a declaration on a US-Polish strategic partnership.63 It is also seeing any 
European initiatives as complementing NATO. Finally, while the UK has 
always been a strong proponent of NATO, and therefore been skeptical of 
EU defense and security initiatives, British Prime Minister Theresa May 
sought a “deep and special partnership” between the UK and the EU post-
Brexit to ensure continued security coordination.64 
In spite of these differences among the European allies, Trump’s ambiguity 
has led to a number of new European defense initiatives designed to make 
Europe more strategically autonomous from the US: 1) In December 2017, 
25 EU member states – except Denmark, Malta, and the UK – agreed on a 
new defense cooperation. The Permanent Structured Cooperation, or 
PESCO, includes commitments and specific projects to harmonize defense, 
pool resources, build up faster response forces, and improve intelligence 
exchanges.65 2) In June 2018, nine EU member countries – including the UK 
– signed an agreement to build a crisis intervention force. As this initiative 
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is outside the EU, it allows for full involvement of the UK even after Brexit.66 
3) In November 2018, the European Parliament voted in favor of the 
European Defense Fund which, if approved by the Council, will provide 13 
billion Euros for collaborative defense research and development projects 
for new technologies and equipment.67  
While growing doubts over American commitment have led to promising 
new European initiatives, the last two years have also laid bare considerable 
differences within Europe when it comes to a common defense. And when 
(or if?) Britain leaves the EU, military spending of the remaining European 
allies will be a mere 20 % compared to the combined spending of the US, 
Canada, and the UK.68 Europe will remain dependent on the US for its 
security and US leadership in moving NATO forward. While Trump has 
given up “strong, principled leadership” 69  of NATO, officials in his 
administration, as well as Congress, have shown that the US is not abdicating 
its role in Europe. 
5.  While European allies could feel assured with previous presidents that 
the US would have their security interests at heart in dealing with Russia, 
Trump has caused unease, if not fear, that his meetings with Putin could lead 
to concessions impacting their security and domestic stability.  
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These fears are grounded in Trump’s fondness of the Russian leader, his as 
yet unclear private interests and entanglements in Russia, and his repeated 
denials of Russian meddling in the 2016 US presidential elections.70 Also, in 
causing disunion within NATO and the EU, and starting a transatlantic trade 
conflict, Trump has played into Russia’s hands and helped further its designs 
to dismantle the transatlantic alliance and the rules-based international 
order.71 Even though he called Russia a “foe”, he appeared ready to leave the 
field to it (and Iran) in Syria with his announced pull-back,72 has suggested 
re-admitting the country into the G7 in spite of the ongoing conflict in 
Ukraine,73 and has been wavering between punishing Russia and letting it 
get away with its behavior with his sanctions policy on the country.74 
With his views and approach on Russia, Trump has not been in sync with 
officials in his own administration and Congress.75 During his 2-year tenure, 
former Defense Secretary Mattis was unequivocal in condemning Russia for 
attempting to redraw international borders by force and in pushing back 
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against Russia. He was also instrumental in getting Trump to approve the 
sale of defensive lethal weapons to Ukraine.76 Likewise, Secretary of State 
Mike Pompeo has strongly condemned Russia’s aggressive behavior since 
coming to office at the end of April 2018, and insisted that Crimea must be 
returned to Ukraine. 77  He also called for increasing US engagement in 
Central and Eastern Europe.78 
In the last 2 years, legislators from both parties passed various resolutions a) 
condemning Russian aggression in Ukraine and urging the US government 
to take action; 79  b) emphasizing the need for transparency regarding 
meetings between Trump and Putin,80 and c) demanding to hold Russia 
accountable for its election interference in 2016.81  More specifically, in 
August 2017, Congress passed legislation, known as Countering America’s 
Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), with an overwhelming 
bipartisan majority, imposing new sanctions on Russia for its cyber 
activities, election interference and intervention in Syria while also 
preventing Trump from scaling back existing measures.82  
On 12 March 2019, the House of Representatives passed legislation 
prohibiting the US government to recognize the Russian annexation of the 
Crimean peninsula and on the 13th it passed a bill urging the government to 
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investigate Putin’s wealth and links to corruption and money laundering.83 
Furthermore, in the Kremlin Act, the House is seeking National Intelligence 
assessments on a) potential Russian military action against NATO members, 
b) potential Russian responses to US and NATO military presence in eastern 
Europe and US support for allies and partners in the region, and c) potential 
areas where Russia could “exploit weaknesses and divisions among the 
governments of its Western adversaries”.84 
Congressional activities and new initiatives such as these, together with the 
steadying voices and policies of some of his cabinet members, have provided 
a moderating effect on Trump’s views on Russia. They have also helped 
allaying some of Europe’s fears, especially in the Baltics and Poland, where 
the threat perception of Russia is acute and a stronger US response is 
desired.85 However, a more recent decision of the Trump administration vis-
à-vis Russia is playing with fire with European security. This concerns 
Trump’s announcement in February 2019 to withdraw from the INF Treaty 
in August if Russia does not verifiably destroy the ground-based mid-range 
cruise missiles it covertly produced within the next six months.86 While 
NATO issued a statement agreeing with the US assessment that Russia 
violated the treaty,87 many European allies, fearing the start of an arms race, 
would have preferred the US not to serve notice and continue attempts at 
bringing Russia back into compliance by staying itself committed. Since it 
first announced its intent to withdraw back in October 2018, they had urged 
the US to continue the dialogue with Russia, but did not come up with 
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specific suggestions as to how to get it to comply.88 Meanwhile, the EU 
(which includes six members that are not in NATO) has not managed to 
produce a joint statement on the issue of its own.89 Moreover, the renewed 
discussions about the INF Treaty, and the implications of its potential 
collapse, have brought to the fore the significant differences between the 
European allies on how to achieve European security. While Poland appears 
supportive of deploying American missiles in Europe, this is complete 
anathema to Germany whose foreign minister is holding out hope for a new 
multilateral arms control treaty.90 Given this and other disunities over the 
treaty within Europe, and the fact that the US has also harbored intentions to 
start building land-based mid-range missiles again to counter China, it is 
unlikely that the treaty will survive.91 
The fallout for relations between the US and Europe will be immense if this 
leads to a new arms race on the European continent. A new treaty, if ever 
there is one, will take years to negotiate, especially as it will need to include 
more countries with nuclear arsenals to have any meaning in an international 
environment that has significantly changed since the INF Treaty was 
concluded in 1987. Meanwhile, Europe will need to start speaking with one 
voice and work out its differences over deterrence, missile defense, and an 
increase of conventional forces.92 As with NATO, the Russia approach and 
policy of the US has presented a paradox.93 For all his coziness with Putin, 
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Trump so far had to largely go along with measures devised by his cabinet 
members, or in Congress, that countered Russian military aggression and its 
cyber activities. At the same time, the rifts the Trump administration’s 
Russia policy caused with Europe have put into starker relief Europe’s own 
divisions regarding how to deal with Russia.  
For the last two years, Europe’s relations with the US have been almost 
continuously stress-tested by Trump and his administration. As a result, the 
two sides have become estranged and alienated in key areas of common 
interest and cooperation. While the problem of “transatlantic divergence” 
was there before Trump,94 it had a different quality. With Trump, a new way 
of doing foreign policy arrived in the White House that upended old 
principles, the concept of alliances, and the meaning of treaties. Before 
Trump, a core pillar of American internationalism was the idea that US 
foreign policy should be a positive-sum endeavor whereas in Trump’s view, 
international relations are zero-sum.95 With such a competitive approach, 
strength is important and existing alliances do not matter for their own sake. 
Unilateralism is a preference, but leadership in the international arena is not 
necessarily abandoned. 
In focusing on his “America First” agenda, Trump has not advocated retreat, 
but purely emphasized narrower US interests:96 a strong military backed up 
by a strong economy. In terms of his policies, this has meant giving up 
leadership in areas that do not fit the agenda (climate change), but continuing 
to stay at the helm of NATO. It has also meant that categories of allies and 
rivals become blurred: old allies can be seen more as competitors (trade 
conflict with the EU), they may be treated less favorably (demands to pay 
more for defense), they may be played against each other (sowing division 
in Europe), and joint agreements with them can be walked away from if they 
are seen as a constraint (Paris Accord, threatening European security by 
 
94  Timothy Garton Ash, “It’s not just Trump. Much of America has turned its back on 
Europe,” The Guardian, 28 September 2018. Online at: https://www.theguardian. 
com/commentisfree/2018/sep/28/trump-america-europe-united-states. 
95  Hal Brands, American Grand Strategy in the Age of Trump, Brookings Institution 
Press, Washington, D.C., 2018, p. 84. 
96  See also Brands, 2018, p. 85. 
Europe and America 
21 
 
walking away from the INF Treaty) or a better deal may be had (Iran). 
Likewise, it has meant that ideology, a shared history, long held values, and 
a rules-based order all matter less, if at all. Finally, it has meant being more 
uncompromising, less diplomatic, and taking unilateral decisions where 
needed to get the deal done. 
So, what does this mean for Europe and the US in the medium-to-long term, 
the time after the next presidential elections in 2020, when a new president 
might enter the White House, or the ones in 2024 at the latest? As many 
observers have pointed out, Trump is part of a wider backlash against the 
effects of globalization highlighting “the growing sense that American 
internationalism has become unmoored from American nationalism”.97 This 
development started in the Bush era and intensified in the following elections 
resulting in an America “ever increasingly inward-looking” and “less willing 
to compromise in the interests of alliance politics.”98 While transatlantic 
relations are bigger than any sitting president,99 things will not return to what 
is perceived by the European allies as the “old normal”. Put bluntly, the 
“Atlantic alliance as we know it is dead”.100 Trump is extreme, and a lot will 
depend whether his manner of doing foreign policy proves effective, and if 
future presidents will therefore adopt and extend it, or whether they will 
revert to more traditional approaches. Meanwhile, the European allies should 
not sit on the sidelines, but work on overcoming their internal divisions, take 
on more of the responsibilities, and commit to a more equal partnership.101 
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